FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT February 21, 2001 February 2001, ERS-GFA-12 Approved by the World Agricultural Outlook Board --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT is published by the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC 20036-5831. This release contains only the text of Food Security Assessment -- tables and graphics are not included. Printed copies of this report will be available from the USDA order desk. Call, toll-free, 1-800-999-6779 and ask for stock # ERS-GFA-12. ERS-NASS accepts MasterCard and Visa. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT Situation and Outlook Series Contents Summary 3 Global Food Security: Overview 4 Regional Summaries: North Africa 12 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 14 Asia 17 Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 20 New Independent States (NIS) 22 Special Articles: Resource Quality, Agricultural Productivity, and Food Security in Developing Countries 24 Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa 30 Boxes: How Food Security Is Assessed 9 Data and Methods 28 Country Statistical Tables 35 Appendices 69 List of Tables 76 List of Figures 78 Summary Fewer Hungry People by 2010; More Intense Poverty for Poorest USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS) projects that average per capita food consumption for 67 low-income countries will increase in the next decade. ERS also projects that the number of people failing to meet their nutritional requirements will decline from 774 million in 2000 to 694 million in 2010, providing an improved outlook for global food security. But the gains are not uniform across countries and in many food insecurity will probably intensify. Sub-Saharan Africa, as the most vulnerable region, accounts for only 24 percent of the population of these 67 countries, but it is projected to account for 63 percent of these "hungry" people in 2010. HIV/AIDS is expected to reduce the region's agricultural productivity, and constraints in financial resources will limit commercial imports, thus leading to declining per capita consumption. ERS evaluated the food security position of low-income countries by projecting the gaps between food consumption (domestic production, plus commercial imports, minus nonfood use) and consumption targets through the next decade. The consumption targets are (1) maintaining per capita food consumption at 1997- 99 levels (also referred to as "status quo") and (2) meeting minimum recommended nutritional requirements. In 2000, the food gap to maintain per capita consumption at 1997- 99 levels in 67 low-income developing countries is estimated at about 7 million tons. The gap to meet minimum nutritional requirements is estimated to be higher at 17 million tons. The food gaps with respect to both consumption targets are projected to widen during the next decade. The gap to maintain per capita consumption will increase 80 percent to 12.7 million tons in 2010, while the nutritional gap will expand 30 percent to more than 22 million tons. For the 67 countries as a whole, the "distribution gap" (the amount of food needed to raise consumption of each income group to the minimum nutritional requirement) is expected to widen by 21 percent and exceed 31 million tons in 2010. The growth of food gaps stands in contrast to the projected trend in the number of hungry people. In fact, the number of people failing to meet nutritional requirements is projected to decline in the next decade, implying that hunger in the food insecure and lower income groups will intensify. ERS has identified Sub-Saharan Africa as the region most vulnerable to food insecurity. The high incidence of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to reduce agricultural productivity, and constraints in financial resources will limit commercial imports, thus leading to declining per capita consumption. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that shows increases in all indicators of food insecurity, such as food gaps and growth in the number of hungry people. Depending upon the future availability of food aid, a portion or all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated. For example, in 1999 roughly 12 million tons of food aid was distributed globally. If the same amount were provided in 2000, it would fill the entire calculated gap to maintain per capita consumption (status quo) and about 66 percent of the nutritional gap. However, all of the available food aid is not going to low- income, food-deficit countries. In 1999, only 7.5 million tons of food aid, or 63 percent of the total, was given to the study countries, and that is about 40 percent of the estimated nutritional gap in 2000. Global Food Security: Overview Average per capita food consumption for the 67 low-income countries is projected to increase in the next decade. The number of people with nutritionally adequate food is also projected to rise, providing an improved outlook for global food security. But the gains are not uniform across countries and in many, food insecurity is projected to intensify. Countries with political instability in particular continue to face the threat of growing food insecurity. [Shahla Shapouri] Food Security Improves Over Time The lower food prices in recent years were welcome news for highly import-dependent countries, helping to improve food affordability and security. The low prices also did not reduce production incentives for those countries that have managed to improve their productivity and reduce their costs. Even among the lowest income developing countries, there are definite signs of rising living standards. At the forefront are some lower income Asian countries, e.g. Vietnam, that have shown steady increases in their food supplies and several indicators supporting the continuation of this trend. This achievement is very important because of the number of people who are at stake-more than 60 percent of the population of the countries covered in this report. The food situation in the lower income Latin American countries such as Bolivia and Guatemala is also improving, a credit to their improved economic and trade policies that have led to steady increases in their export earnings that finance imports. Similarly in the North African and New Independent States (NIS) countries, several of which are oil exporters, the oil price hike should provide a stronger basis on which to expand food imports. Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is almost entirely dependent on domestic production, which in most countries is projected to grow at too slow a pace to allow increases in per capita consumption. The region's nutritional food gap is projected to increase 40 percent, exceeding 17 million tons in 2010. Despite all the reasons for optimism in four of the five regions,the unequal distribution of food, both at the international and national levels, remains a major obstacle to improving food security among the poor. Even among the prosperous regions, some countries are lagging behind. Although some of these countries have inadequate resources, both physical and financial, the most severe food-insecure countries are the ones that have internal political instability. The situations in Haiti and Afghanistan are clear examples of dysfunctional economies and food insecurity. The future food security position of the 67 developing countries included in this study is evaluated by projecting the gaps between food consumption (domestic production, plus commercial imports, minus nonfood use) and two different consumption targets through the next decade. Food aid, although a part of the historical food supply, is excluded in the projections presenting the food gaps that countries face when left to their own resources. The two consumption targets are (1) maintaining per capita consumption at the 1997-99 level (also referred to as status quo) and (2) meeting minimum recommended nutritional requirements (see box 1). The estimated nutritional gap only measures the gap in calorie consumption and does not consider other factors such as poor utilization of food due to inadequate consumption of micronutrients and lack of health and sanitary facilities. Because the national level estimates represent the average food gaps and mask the impact of unequal incomes on food security, we also estimate a "distribution gap." This gap is defined as the amount of food needed to raise food consumption for each income group to the level that meets nutritional requirements. This indicator captures the impacts of unequal purchasing power or food access. What Is New in This Report... This report is an updated version of the 1999 report, with all historical and projected data updated. The food production estimates for the year 2000 are based on USDA data as of September/October 2000. The financial and macroeconomic data are updated based on the latest World Bank data. The projected macroeconomic variables are either extrapolations based on calculated growth rates for 1980-98 or are World Bank projections/estimations. In this report, we have included a scenario that examines the impact of slower growth in crop area on food security. In most food insecure countries, increases in food production are mainly due to the expansion of cropland. Our projections confirm that there will be a need for a substantial increase in food production over the next decade to meet nutritional requirements in the lower income countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The existing conditions for food production and prospects for expansion vary greatly. However, there are ample studies suggesting that the increased food supply will have to come from the intensification of production. This applies to Asia and to a lesser extent to Latin America and Africa. In the latter regions, opportunities to expand the production area exist, but unrestrained expansion can lead to long-term damage to natural resources and the environment. The analysis of the scenario of slower growth in production area confirms and quantifies what common sense suggests: without any increase in investment in production intensification, lower income countries tend to become more food insecure. This report also includes two special articles. The first article is entitled "Factors Affecting Agricultural Productivity of Developing Countries" and concludes that agricultural productivity is important for food security both through its impact on food supplies and prices, and through its impact on the incomes and purchasing power of farmers. In this context, land quality is related to both food availability and food access. Land quality is, on average, lower in low-income food-deficit countries than it is in high-income countries. This has important implications for policymakers concerned with improving food security, both through protection and/or improvement of land quality itself and through recognition of the distinct roles played by more conventional agricultural inputs in areas that differ in land quality. The second article is entitled "HIV/AIDS and the Sub-Saharan African Food Market." The article concludes that the HIV/AIDS epidemic will reduce labor quality and productivity and will have long-term implications on the performance of the agricultural sector of the highly affected countries. The projected long-term food outlook for these countries shows a steady increase in food gaps in part due to the impact of HIV/AIDS, and indicates that the situation will worsen if productivity declines further. This means that to minimize the impact of HIV/AIDS, policies should combine educational messages to prevent the spread of the disease and economic assistance and investment in areas such as introducing labor-saving technologies. The Paradox: Growing Food Gaps And the Decline in the Number of Undernourished People Food gaps based on status quo and nutritional targets and distribution gaps are projected to grow (tables 1 and 2). In contrast, a decline in the number of people failing to meet the nutritional target is estimated. This means that nutritional disparity among and within countries will intensify more than food deficits will spread. In other words, the hunger problem will get more severe in the vulnerable countries and/or among the lower income groups. The status quo food gaps (or food needed to maintain per capita consumption at the 1997-99 base level) are estimated at 7 million tons for 2000, much lower than the projected 12.7 million tons for 1999 (table 1 and fig. 1). This drop can be attributed to the lower per capita consumption target. This is a moving average, which fell significantly due to last year's drought in North Africa. The food gaps to meet minimum nutritional requirements are estimated at 17 million tons, higher than last year's estimate of 15 million tons. When the impact of unequal incomes is taken into account, as we do in the distribution gap the estimated results for the 67 countries show that food gaps increased significantly relative to the national average (table 2). In 2000, the distribution gap is estimated to be more than 25 million tons, 33 percent larger than the national average nutritional gap. Based on the estimated distribution gaps, we calculated the number of people (in each income quintile) whose consumption falls short of the minimum nutritional requirement in each country. For the 67 countries, the number of people failing to meet the nutritional target is projected to decline from 771 million in 2000 to 695 million by 2010. Overall, the long-term food gaps for the 67 countries are lower than those reported in last year's assessment, principally due to the assumptions of higher economic growth rates for the Asian and Latin American countries. For the same reason, in the 1999 Food Security Assessment report, we projected the number of people failing to meet the nutritional target to grow and for 2009 our projection was higher than the current projection. Sub-Saharan Africa Remains the most Vulnerable Region Of the 37 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita consumption is projected to rise in only 7 countries. Even in those countries, the growth is not expected to be particularly strong. In 2010, consumption for 60 percent of the region's population is projected to fall short of nutritional requirements. In addition, the region is projected to account for nearly two-thirds of the hungry people in the 67 countries, but it accounts for only about one-fourth of the population (fig. 2). The region's nutritional gap is estimated to account for 65 percent of the nutritional gap for the 67 countries in total in 2000. This number is projected to jump to 76 percent in 2010. The region accounts for only 24 percent of the population of the 67 countries, thus indicating the severity of the region's food security situation. In Sub-Saharan Africa, domestic food production accounts for about 80 percent of consumption. During the next decade, production growth is projected to fall short of historical rates and average 2.1 percent per year versus 2.4 percent during 1980- 99. The reason for the expected lower production growth is twofold. First, nearly 90 percent of the region's historical grain production growth stemmed from area expansion. This trend is not expected to continue in the future, as much of the region's remaining land area is marginal for agricultural purposes. Second, the decline in population growth due to spread of HIV/AIDS is expected to reduce labor productivity. Labor remains the essential factor of production and lack of labor- saving technologies will lead to a decline in food production (see "Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa"). In the Food Security model, the marginal productivity of labor is assumed constant over the projection period. For the Sub-Saharan countries, this may be an overestimation because the decline in population growth is in part due to the spread of HIV/AIDS, which affects the most productive segment of the population. The distribution gap, which incorporates the impact of skewed income distribution, is projected to rise from 15.3 million tons in 2000 to 22.5 million tons in 2010, 10 percent higher than the national average nutrition gap. The number of people in different income quintiles who fail to meet their nutritional requirement is projected to increase from 344 million to 435 million in 2010. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where food security, both in terms of the size of the gaps and the number of undernourished people is expected to rise. Food Availability will Increase in Most Low Income Asian and Latin American Countries Per capita consumption in the 10 Asian countries covered in this report is projected to increase, on average, in the next decade. There are problem areas, however. Afghanistan and North Korea, and to a lesser extent, Bangladesh, account for most of the region's nutrition gaps during the projection period. The region's distribution gap is projected to decrease during the next decade, as is the number of people who cannot meet their nutritional requirement. The region has about 65 percent of the population of countries covered in the report, but is projected to account for only 26 percent of the people who cannot meet their nutritional requirement in 2010. Per capita food consumption in most of the lower income Latin American and Caribbean countries (11 countries) is expected to improve. Even with a relatively slow increase in food production, strong commercial import growth will raise food supplies sufficiently to keep up with population growth. Another positive sign is the projected decline in the number of people with inadequate food supplies. Despite this bright picture at the aggregate level, food insecurity is growing in a few countries and highly skewed purchasing power aggravates the problem. In 2000, the estimated distribution gap (that captures inequality in food access) is about six fold higher than of the national average nutritional gap. Nutritional gaps both at the national average and disaggregated levels (distribution gap) are projected to increase, indicating growth in intensity of hunger in countries such as Haiti. North Africa and NIS Face Challenge of Financing Imports Food imports make up about 42 percent of North Africa's consumption needs, and this level is projected to continue through 2010. Financing this level of imports in the next decade is the critical element to ensure food security. The region's two largest food importers, Egypt and Algeria, to varying degrees, depend on oil and gas revenues. With the real prices of oil and gas recovering, these countries should be able to cover their import needs. Short-term production variability creates a challenge to food security in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Morocco is the extreme case because it has one of the highest levels of production variability in the world (app. 3). In Algeria, political difficulties are the main threat to food security. This year, because of the expected windfall in oil export revenues, imports are likely to increase to fill these gaps. The long-term food security of the country is threatened because of low investment that has led to slow growth in agricultural production and increased food-import dependency of the country; about 70 percent of grain consumption was imported during 1997-99. The ability to finance imports will be the critical factor to ensure food security. We project positive growth for agricultural productivity and import capacity of the NIS countries, but political uncertainty remains a major issue. The drought in 2000 has led to food gaps in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Although Georgia experienced the largest percentage production shock in 2000, the food gaps are expected to be relatively more severe in Armenia and Tajikistan. Tajikistan is the only country where food gaps are expected to continue over the next decade. Access to food by lower income groups in a few of these countries is a problem now, but should improve as the economies of these countries grow. Food Aid Donations Are Increasing Depending upon the future availability of food aid, a portion or all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated. For example, in 1999 roughly 11.9 million tons of food aid were distributed globally (fig. 3). If the same amount were provided in 2000, it would fill the entire calculated gap to maintain per capita consumption (status quo) and about 66 percent of the nutritional gap. However, all of the available food aid is not going to low- income, food-deficit countries. In 1999, only 7.5 million tons, or 63 percent of total food aid were given to the countries studied in this report, and the aid would cover about 40 percent of their estimated nutritional gap in 2000. Food aid shipments for 1999 grew significantly from the 1996 level of 6.6 million tons. The main source of the hike in donations was the United States, while the European Union and Japan reduced their allocations. Although the amount of food aid donations was virtually unchanged from 1998 to 1999, allocations to the study countries declined by 20 percent. Allocations to Asian and Latin American countries declined, while those to Sub- Saharan countries remained roughly the same at 2.8 million tons. Allocations of available food aid are not necessarily based on nutritional needs. Other factors such as political instability leading to the collapse of internal marketing systems and financial difficulties that disrupt commercial imports can play an important role in food aid allocations among countries. For example, in 1999, the bulk of the increase in U.S. food aid was allocated to Russia. In 1998, Indonesia was the third largest recipient of food aid after Bangladesh because of serious food deficits caused by the financial crisis and internal problems. The share of food aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa-the most food insecure region according to who cannot meet their nutritional requirement in 2010. Per capita food consumption in most of the lower income Latin American and Caribbean countries (11 countries) is expected to improve. Even with a relatively slow increase in food production, strong commercial import growth will raise food supplies sufficiently to keep up with population growth. Another positive sign is the projected decline in the number of people with inadequate food supplies. Despite this bright picture at the aggregate level, food insecurity is growing in a few countries and highly skewed purchasing power aggravates the problem. In 2000, the estimated distribution gap (that captures inequality in food access) is about six fold higher than of the national average nutritional gap. Nutritional gaps both at the national average and disaggregated levels (distribution gap) are projected to increase, indicating growth in intensity of hunger in countries such as Haiti. North Africa and NIS Face Challenge of Financing Imports Food imports make up about 42 percent of North Africa's consumption needs, and this level is projected to continue through 2010. Financing this level of imports in the next decade is the critical element to ensure food security. The region's two largest food importers, Egypt and Algeria, to varying degrees, depend on oil and gas revenues. With the real prices of oil and gas recovering, these countries should be able to cover their import needs. Short-term production variability creates a challenge to food security in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Morocco is the extreme case because it has one of the highest levels of production variability in the world (app. 3). In Algeria, political difficulties are the main threat to food security. This year, because of the expected windfall in oil export revenues, imports are likely to increase to fill these gaps. The long-term food security of the country is threatened because of low investment that has led to slow growth in agricultural production and increased food-import dependency of the country; about 70 percent of grain consumption was imported during 1997-99. The ability to finance imports will be the critical factor to ensure food security. We project positive growth for agricultural productivity and import capacity of the NIS countries, but political uncertainty remains a major issue. The drought in 2000 has led to food gaps in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Although Georgia experienced the largest percentage production shock in 2000, the food gaps are expected to be relatively more severe in Armenia and Tajikistan. Tajikistan is the only country where food gaps are expected to continue over the next decade. Access to food by lower income groups in a few of these countries is a problem now, but should improve as the economies of these countries grow. Food Aid Donations Are Increasing Depending upon the future availability of food aid, a portion or all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated. For example, in 1999 roughly 11.9 million tons of food aid were distributed globally (fig. 3). If the same amount were provided in 2000, it would fill the entire calculated gap to maintain per capita consumption (status quo) and about 66 percent of the nutritional gap. However, all of the available food aid is not going to low- income, food-deficit countries. In 1999, only 7.5 million tons, or 63 percent of total food aid were given to the countries studied in this report, and the aid would cover about 40 percent of their estimated nutritional gap in 2000. Food aid shipments for 1999 grew significantly from the 1996 level of 6.6 million tons. The main source of the hike in donations was the United States, while the European Union and Japan reduced their allocations. Although the amount of food aid donations was virtually unchanged from 1998 to 1999, allocations to the study countries declined by 20 percent. Allocations to Asian and Latin American countries declined, while those to Sub- Saharan countries remained roughly the same at 2.8 million tons. Allocations of available food aid are not necessarily based on nutritional needs. Other factors such as political instability leading to the collapse of internal marketing systems and financial difficulties that disrupt commercial imports can play an important role in food aid allocations among countries. For example, in 1999, the bulk of the increase in U.S. food aid was allocated to Russia. In 1998, Indonesia was the third largest recipient of food aid after Bangladesh because of serious food deficits caused by the financial crisis and internal problems. The share of food aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa-the most food insecure region according to our estimates-was only 24 percent in 1999. If this level of food aid is continued, it will cover only 23 percent of the estimated nutritional gap for the region in 2000. Constraints in Expanding Agricultural Area In many low-income countries, increases in agricultural output mainly have stemmed from area expansion. In Sub-Saharan Africa, area expansion accounted for more than 80 percent of grain output growth between 1980-99. This means that yield growth contributed to less than 20 percent of the growth. In Latin America, area expansion accounted for 68 percent of the growth in grain production. In Asia, the reverse was true-area expansion accounted for less than 5 percent of the growth in grain output. The long-term prospects for acreage expansion are not bright, because, in most countries, a large part of land that could be used for farming is unfit to cultivate without major investment. In Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, continued expansion of cropland means converting range and forestland to crop production, a process with high economic and environmental costs. According to FAO estimates, about half of the land that could be used to produce food in Sub-Saharan Africa has poor quality soil. Sub-Saharan Africa has a vast and diverse land area, but the region faces a number of resource constraints (such as lack of water) to sustainable agricultural growth. Land quality as defined by soil quality, climate, and rainfall is a crucial factor determining agricultural productivity, as is discussed in more detail in the special article "Resource Quality, Agricultural Productivity, and Food Security in Developing Countries." Cross-country analysis confirms that low quality in cropland is significantly associated with low agricultural productivity. Loss of land available to agriculture-due to land degradation or expansion of urban areas-is a reality in many areas, especially in developing countries. While new technology has been successful in providing data on the existing quality of land, limited data are available on changes of land quality over time. In the absence of precise projections, we analyze a scenario where area expansion is half the rate used in the base model for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, NIS, and North Africa. In Asia, where annual area growth between 1980 and 1999 was less than 0.1 of a percent, we assumed area to remain constant during the entire projection period. In Sub-Saharan Africa, production in the baseline scenario was projected to grow at a rate of 2.1 percent per year; under the reduced area growth scenario, this rate is projected to fall to 1.7 percent. As a result of the slower production growth, the region's nutritional gap in 2010 jumps by 34 percent to more than 22 million tons (fig. 4). In other regions, the cut in area is much less significant either because of high import capacity such as the case of North Africa or potential for yields to be the main contributor to production growth, i.e. Asia. The results indicate that for food-insecure countries, in particular countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the only option to sustain production growth is to increase yields. Yields highly depend on the use of improved inputs. Data show that Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest labor productivity and that it is declining. Similarly, the region's fertilizer use is the lowest and on a declining trend. Even with an increase in fertilizer use, yields may not increase much. A cross-country estimate for developing countries showed that a 1-percent increase in fertilizer use results only in a 0.1- to 0.3-percent increase in yield. The principal factor limiting yield response to fertilizer use is the inadequate supply of water during the growing season. Irrigation can be a solution, but is too costly and in Sub- Saharan Africa only 4.2 percent of cropland is irrigated. Although water availability varies considerably across regions, it has been a serious problem in many countries. In addition, the agricultural sector consumes over half of the fresh water in most countries and could face increased competing demands from urban consumers and industrial uses in the future. Overall, farm management practices, in particular improved efficiency in the use of water, can be the first step to improving food security in the vulnerable countries. To increase yields, high-yielding varieties appropriate for specific agroclimatic conditions are essential. The success, however, depends on the investment in supportive institutions for research and extension to diffuse the new varieties to farmers. For the resource-poor countries, the long-term strategy should aim at diversifying the sources of income of the farmers. In these countries, the agricultural sector alone cannot generate adequate incomes and food to support their growing populations. Policies to promote rural development not only would improve income distribution, they would allow the poor the means to buy the food they need and would also reduce pressure on land. References Cleaver, Kevin, Gotz Schreiber. Reversing the Spiral: The Population, Agricultural, and Environment Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994. Delgado, Christopher. "Africa's Changing Agricultural Development Strategies: Past and Present Paradigms as a Guide to the Future." Washington, DC: IFPRI, 1995. Harold, Courtney; Bruce Larson; Linda Scott. "Fertilizer Consumption Remains Low," International Agricultural and Trade Reports: Africa and Middle East Situation and Outlook Series, WRS- 94-3; U.S. Dept. of Agri., Econ. Res. Ser., 1994. Ingram, Kevin; George Frisvold. "Productivity in African Agriculture: Sources of Growth and Stagnation," International Agricultural and Trade Reports: Africa and Middle East Situation and Outlook Series. WRS-94-3; U.S. Dept. of Agri., Econ. Res. Ser., 1994. Rosegrant, Mark L. "Water Resources in the twenty-first Century: Challenges and Implications for Action." Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1997. Seckler, D.; D. Gollin; P. Antoine. Agricultural Potential of "Mid-Africa": A Technological Assessment. World Bank Discussion Papers 126, Washington, DC, 1991. United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization. Agriculture: Towards 2010. Rome, 1993. Wiebe, Keith D.; Meredith J. Soule; David E. Schimmelpfennig. "Agricultural Productivity and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa." Food Security Assessment, GFA-10; U.S. Dept. of Agri., Econ. Res. Ser., 1999. North Africa Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have experienced a severe drought this year. However, this translates into only modest food gaps for Algeria and Morocco. Only Algeria faces a longrun food deficit. Allowing for a land degradation scenario changes this projection only slightly, given the limited land availability for production in the region. [Michael Trueblood] Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have experienced a serious drought in 2000 leading to production deviations that range from 48 percent to 64 percent below trend. In the case of Morocco, a country with one of the highest levels of production variability in the world, the shortfall is even more severe than last year's deficit, compounding a difficult situation. These significant production shocks translate into relatively modest food gaps. All of these countries are middle income countries with relatively high per capita consumption levels compared to other countries in this report. Tunisia had the smallest shock and appears able to compensate for the shortfall with commercial imports. For Morocco, there is no food gap in 2000 based upon recent per capita consumption trends, but there is a nutrition-based food gap of 1 million tons. Morocco represents an extreme case in which the recent per capita consumption target can change dramatically each year. Because of last year's drought, the per capita consumption target-a 3-year moving average-dropped from 398 kg/cap to 241 kg/cap. Given this lower consumption target, assuming trend level of commercial imports, the target can be met despite the second year of drought. Using last year's consumption target (i.e. average consumption of the years 1996-98) would translate into a food gap of 4.1 million tons under the same assumptions. Algeria shows a food gap of 361,000 tons to maintain recent per capita consumption levels and a food gap of 518,000 tons to meet nutritional requirements. However, these gaps will probably be fully met this year because of Algeria's expected windfall in oil and gas export revenues from high world prices, which will allow for higher imports. Analysis of the ratio of food import costs to export revenues suggests that even an above-average level of imports could be easily afforded compared with many previous years. Analyzing the distribution of food consumption, the lower income groups in Algeria are the most vulnerable in the short and longrun: the four lowest income quintiles are projected not to meet minimum nutrition requirements, both in 2000 and 2010. For Morocco, the impact of the consecutive droughts in 1999 and 2000 is such that all income groups are projected to be unable to meet nutrition requirements in 2000. However, by 2010, this situation should be turned around with all income groups meeting these requirements. In Egypt and Tunisia, all income groups are estimated to have nutritionally adequate food supplies in both 2000 and 2010. The four countries in North Africa examined in this report will continue to face limited land and water resources and become more reliant on food imports over time. The primary economic question is whether they will be able to afford these imports to sustain their current consumption levels (holding aside the issue of production volatility). However, another question is, would food gaps develop if area expansion were constrained? For the first question, only Algeria is projected to show longrun food gaps (718,000 tons by 2010 to maintain current per capita consumption levels, which is about 7 percent of total food supplies). This is a somewhat tenuous projection in the case of Algeria, given its high dependency on oil and gas revenues, because of the great uncertainty of petroleum prices. If oil prices are sustained at recent levels, these food gaps could easily be eliminated. As for the second question, assuming that crop land grows half as rapidly, the gaps only increase for Algeria, and even then only slightly (up to 758,000 tons by 2010). This can be explained by the small impact that crop land growth has in the base case (less than 1 percent growth per year, which is reduced to 0.5 percent growth in the modified scenario). A similar explanation applies to the other North African countries in this report. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Of the 37 countries in the region, per capita consumption is projected to rise in only 7 countries. In 2010, consumption for 60 percent of the region's population is projected to fall short of nutritional requirements. In addition, the region is projected to account for nearly two-thirds of the hungry people in the 67 countries, while accounting for only 24 percent of the population. [Stacey Rosen] Food security in Sub-Saharan Africa is almost entirely dependent on domestic production. Imports, as a share of the region's total food supplies, averaged around 10 percent in the late 1990s despite strong growth in commercial imports. The food aid share of imports peaked in the late 1980s at roughly 40 percent. In more recent years, that share has averaged less than 20 percent of imports. Sub-Saharan Africa's agricultural productivity-as measured by output relative to agricultural land area-has accelerated over time. Between 1990-98, this productivity indicator rose 2.3 percent per year. This compares quite favorably to the success stories among the East and Southeast Asian countries where growth measured just under 2.5 percent during the same time period. However, Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth averaged 2.7 percent per year since 1990, meaning that productivity declined on a per capita basis. Moreover, the region's absolute level of productivity measured only about 65 percent of that of the Asian countries. This low level of productivity is directly attributable to low input use. Fertilizer use, the lowest rates in the world, actually declined between 1990 and 1998. Irrigated area as a share of total agricultural area stagnated during the 1990s and measured only about 3 percent in 1998. In Latin America, this share exceeded 11 percent and in Asia 20 percent. Nearly 90 percent of the region's historical grain production growth stemmed from area expansion. This trend is not expected to continue in the future, as much of the region's remaining land area is marginal for agricultural purposes. Production growth during the next decade is projected to fall short of historical rates and average 2.1 percent per year. To close the nutritional food gap, production would need to rise 2.9 percent per year. Given the region's limitations to expanding land area, achieving this growth rate would require investment in research and extension activities, improved infrastructure, and increased input use. Similar to the historical period, imports will not be a significant factor in the food security equation. Commercial imports are projected to account for less than 8 percent of food supplies in 2010 as slow export earnings growth is expected to constrain import capacity. Food aid allocations to the region may rise, but that has not been the case in recent years. Political and financial instability have been deciding factors in global food aid allocations. Sub-Saharan Africa, the most vulnerable region according to our analysis, received only a quarter of global food aid in 1999. This slow production and import growth is expected to result in a continuation in the declining trend in per capita consumption. Of the 37 countries in the region, per capita consumption is projected to rise in only 7 countries-Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Togo. Even in these countries, the growth is not expected to be particularly strong. For example, Sudan is expected to experience the highest growth, but still only 1.4 percent per year. For Sudan, growth in grain output is not projected to match that of the historical period, but it will still outpace population growth by more than 1 percent per year. The same is true for Ethiopia and Mozambique. Slow population growth projections, due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, is the primary factor behind the positive per capita consumption growth as production growth is projected to be quite slow-even falling short of the regional average. For Kenya, Chad, and Togo, the growth is negligible. The region's food gap to maintain consumption is projected to rise about 65 percent during the next 10 years to 8.3 million tons in 2010. The nutritional food gap is projected to increase 40 percent, nearing 17 million tons in 2010. In other words, the region would need more than two times the amount of food to achieve nutritionally adequate diets as compared with simply maintaining the recent standard. The region's nutritional gap is estimated to account for 65 percent of the nutritional gap for the 67 countries in total in 2000. This number is projected to jump to 76 percent in 2010. The region accounts for only 24 percent of the population of the 67 countries, thus indicating the severity of the region's food security situation. The situation appears even more desperate when examining projected consumption by income group. The distribution gap-the amount of food needed to raise consumption in each income group to the nutritional target-is projected to increase 40 percent during the next decade, reaching almost 23 million tons in 2010. At the same time, the number of people in the region consuming inadequate diets is projected to rise 25 percent during the next decade. The fact that this gap is projected to rise at a faster rate than the number of hungry people is an indicator that the food security problems in this region will not only spread, they will intensify. In 2010, consumption for 60 percent of the region's population is projected to fall short of nutritional requirements. In addition, the region is projected to account for nearly two-thirds of the hungry people in the 67 countries, while accounting for only 24 percent of the total population (see fig. 2 in the Overview). Given the region's land constraints, we ran a scenario of reduced area growth. In the base scenario, agricultural area was projected to rise 1.2 percent per year. For the scenario, this growth was cut in half. As a result of these changes, the nutritional gap is projected at more than 22 million tons-30 percent above that under the base scenario (see fig. 4 in the Overview). Given the precarious food security position of the region, the implications of lower domestic production growth rates are particularly acute for the lower income groups. The number of people with inadequate diets jumps 15 percent relative to the base scenario to 435 million as consumption in only the highest income group is projected to exceed the minimum nutritional requirement. While policy reform in the region has had some positive effects (i.e., market-determined prices, private sector involvement in food marketing), there is considerable room for improvement. Investment is needed to improve rural infrastructure to facilitate the transport of agricultural inputs and products. Policies are needed to promote the continued participation of the private sector in distributing inputs and marketing output. The HIV/AIDS crisis, which has already reduced the supply and productivity of labor in many countries, must be addressed through education efforts. Countries in this region need to participate in international trade negotiations to improve their trade and market access. The discussion of debt forgiveness within the international community is welcome news for these countries and should open opportunities for increased investment. Gross domestic investment in the region declined from 23 percent of GDP in 1980 to 18 percent in 1997. The new U.S. initiative-The African Growth and Opportunity Act-was signed into law on May 18, 2000. It provides preferential access to U.S. markets for eligible products from designated countries within the region as well as improved access to U.S. credit and technical expertise. Asia The region's food security situation is projected to improve during the next decade as the share of population consuming nutritionally inadequate diets falls from an estimated 17 percent in 2000 to 9 percent in 2010. Most of the region's improvements can be attributed to India. [Stacey Rosen] The Asia region in this report includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Fewer people in the region are expected to be hungry in 2010 than in 2000. The aggregate food security situation for the region is projected to improve during the next decade, as a larger number of people will consume nutritionally adequate diets. The region's achievements in agricultural growth during the last two decades were largely a result of rapid growth in input use and productivity. Investment in public research and extension, expansion of irrigated area, and improvements in rural infrastructure and human capital contributed greatly to the productivity growth. Concerns are growing, however, as population growth is placing pressure on natural resources. Already, nearly 80 percent of the region's potentially arable land is cultivated. In addition, there is increasing competition for water from household and industrial uses that will invariably raise costs. Grain output in the region rose roughly 2.5 percent per year during the historical period (1980-99) due to strong yield growth. This growth was supported by steady increases in irrigated land area and fertilizer use. In 1998, 36 percent of the region's cultivated land was irrigated-twice the world average. Fertilizer use jumped more than 5 percent per year and averaged 130 kilograms per hectare, roughly 10 percent above the world average. The strong production growth, coupled with rapid commercial import growth, resulted in an increase in per capita consumption and will continue to sustain it through the next decade. Improvements in food security are also reflected in food consumption by income group. In 2000, consumption in all income groups, with the exception of the lowest 20 percent, is estimated to exceed the minimum nutritional requirement. In 2000, 17 percent of the region's population are estimated to be hungry. By 2010, we project that this share will fall to 9 percent, or 177 million people. Most of the region's improvements can be attributed to India whose population of more than 1 billion is by far the largest in the region and therefore influences the performance of the region on the whole. Agricultural output per hectare, a measure of land productivity, grew at an annual rate of 3.3 percent-twice the U.S. and world average rates. This growth was supported by high rates of input use. Roughly 35 percent of cultivated land is irrigated, twice the world average. The country is estimated to have no status quo or nutritional food gaps in 2000. Per capita consumption is projected to continue its upward trend during the next decade, ensuring that by 2010, consumption in all income groups, on average, will exceed the nutritional requirement. However, within the lowest income group, there will be people who cannot afford to purchase enough food for an adequate diet. Indonesia is beginning to recover from the international financial crisis that hit in 1997 and continued through early 1999. The country's real GDP declined nearly 14 percent in 1998 and a further 4 percent in 1999. The currency depreciation resulted in an inflation rate of 70 percent which, in turn, led to a decline in consumption. For example, wheat consumption declined 50 percent from the 1996 peak to 1998. Food aid shipments of 1 million tons in 1998 and 500,000 tons in 1999 were crucial in preventing famine. The situation began to stabilize in 1999 and real GDP growth for 2000 is estimated at around 2 percent. The projections indicate that the country's nutritional food requirements were being met as of 1999 and that the food security situation is expected to improve through the next decade. Political uncertainty makes projections for North Korea and Afghanistan difficult. North Korea has been characterized by a stagnating economy that has reduced both commercial import capacity and the supply of agricultural inputs. Per capita consumption fell 25 percent during the 1990s. North Korea is estimated to account for a third of Asia's nutritional food gap in 2000. While the situation is projected to improve, it is still desperate. By 2010, consumption in only the top income group is expected to exceed the minimum target, meaning that roughly 80 percent of the population will have inadequate diets. Afghanistan is estimated to account for the other two-thirds of the region's nutritional gap in 2000. Production, although rebounding from the lowest points of the early 1990s, has not recovered to the levels achieved in the 1980s. Per capita consumption in 1999 was roughly half of the mid-1980s level; it is projected to fall more than 1 percent per year through 2010. Consumption will fall short of nutritional requirements in all income groups; in even the highest ncome group consumption is projected at only 80 percent of the nutritional target in 2010. Considering the land constraints facing the region-primarily attributable to population pressures-we ran a scenario for Asia assuming zero area growth. In the base scenario, total area was projected to rise 0.3 percent per year. Under the reduced area scenario, consumption for 23 percent of the population-or 459 million people-will fall short of the nutritional requirement in 2010. In the base scenario, only 9 percent of the population was projected to consume an inadequate diet. The region's per capita consumption growth is cut by more than half-from 0.5 percent per year to 0.2 percent. While this lower area growth adversely affected all countries in the region, the implications varied. For example, the food security position of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam was so strong, that even with lower production growth, nutritional requirements will continue to be met across all income groups. Conversely, in India and Pakistan, the drop in output results in inadequate diets for the lowest income group. In Afghanistan and North Korea, even consumption in the top income group is projected to fall below the nutritional target. Therefore, what seems to be a very small change in one variable can have severe implications for consumption, particularly for the poorest segments of the population, in many countries in the region. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Food security in the region is projected to improve as commercial imports are expected to fill most food gaps thanks to an optimistic economic outlook for most countries. Haiti and Nicaragua, the poorest countries in the region, will continue to depend on food aid. [Birgit Meade] Food security in most of the 11 countries in this region1 is improving as increases in food production combined with food imports will grow at a faster rate than population. Regional per capita consumption is projected to increase roughly 1 percent per year over the next 10 years. Despite this positive trend there remain four countries with insufficient food supplies to meet consumption requirements. Compared to the 1999 projections, this year's results show considerably lower food gaps by the end of this decade, thanks to a more optimistic economic outlook. The region is expected to import almost half of its grain consumption. High import dependency for staple foods means that the financial situation of the countries will be a crucial factor in maintaining food security. The nutritional food gap is projected to reach 900,000 tons by 2010. This projection is 36 percent lower than last year's projection for 2009 which illustrates growing optimism for the region based on agricultural and economic performance in recent years. At the country level, food insecurity continues to be of concern in Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Bolivia and Honduras are projected to improve over time. Bolivia is expected to eliminate its food gaps by 2005 if projected production increases can indeed be realized. Honduras is still recovering from Hurricane Mitch, but is projected to raise per capita consumption above the base level during the next 10 years. Despite this positive trend, hunger will still remain a problem in Honduras where the nutritional gap is projected at 6 percent of total food availability in 2010. Haiti and Nicaragua, the two poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, have not been able to achieve adequate production to eliminate food gaps, which amount to one-third of grain and root crop requirements. Commercial imports are not expected to be able to compensate for the production shortfalls because of insufficient foreign exchange. Both countries are projected to rely on food aid receipts over the next decade. While Haiti's political deadlock offers little hope for dramatic economic improvements, Nicaragua has enjoyed steady economic growth and fast increasing export earnings of 11 percent annually for the last few years. However, the country will need foreign investment to further expand its export sectors. In December, Nicaragua will find out if it is included in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Criteria include good economic performance, improved governance and more openness. If Nicaragua qualifies for relief on its debt of $6.3 billion it will be in a much better position to improve infrastructure and attract international investors. Highly skewed income distribution remains the root cause of food insecurity in the region. The size of the distribution gap in 2000 is about 2.6 times the average nutrition gap. The good news is, however, that an increase in food availability and economic prosperity is expected to improve the food situation of the poor in the longrun. By 2010, the number of hungry people is projected to decline by 30 percent to 44 million and 2010 project the distribution gap projected to decline slightly, by 4 percent. More than 80 percent of the population of Haiti and Nicaragua is projected to fail to meet their nutritional requirements by 2010. On the other hand, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Peru are expected to limit food deficits to less than 20 percent of their populations. The overall progress towards food security in the last two decades was mainly due to improvements in the performance of the export sector. Production growth of the staple food crops has been slow and most of the growth was due to area expansion. This pattern of growth is not sustainable over the next decade.While Latin America has the world's largest reserves of cultivable land-the agricultural potential of the region is estimated at 576 million hectares-more than half of this land has been adversely affected by land degradation, mostly soil erosion, but also loss of nutrients. In order to examine the impact of resource constraints, in particular land degradation, a scenario of slower area expansion was analyzed for all regions. Area growth in Latin America and the Caribbean was assumed to be half the baseline rate. In this scenario, the average nutritional food gap increased by 30 percent and the status quo gap increased by more than 50 percent relative to the baseline scenario. In addition, the number of people vulnerable to food insecurity would be higher. This means, again, that in the absence of investment in improved technologies that raise land productivity, food security in the poorer countries will be critically dependent upon area expansion. 1 The countries studied here are four Central American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; three Caribbean countries: the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica; and four South American countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. New Independent States (NIS) Droughts in Georgia and Tajikistan in 2000 led to shortrun food gaps in these countries. Only Tajikistan will continue to display food gaps over the next decade. Access to food by lower income groups is a problem now in a few of these countries, but it should improve as the economies of these countries grow. Political stability and investment will be key. [Michael Trueblood] Severe droughts in Georgia and Tajikistan in 2000 have affected output and are estimated to lead to food gaps in these countries. Based upon recent per capita consumption levels, the food gap in Georgia is estimated to be 68,000 tons (7 percent of total supplies) and 208,000 tons in Tajikistan (15 percent of total food supplies). Using a nutrition standard, the food gaps are estimated to be 242,000 tons and 253,000 tons, respectively (21 percent and 17 percent of total supplies). Of the five NIS countries examined in this report, only Tajikistan is projected to have longrun food gaps (the nutrition-based food gap is projected at 70,000 tons by 2010, 4 percent of supplies). Over the last 10-15 years, one common pattern among these five countries is that area sown has increased, especially after independence, offsetting declining yields. In many transition economies, yields declined after subsidies on inputs like fertilizer and plant protection agents were removed and their application levels declined. Future projections assume that the growth in land sown will slow (from 3-4 percent per year to 1-2 percent per year) and that yields will resume moderately positive growth rates ranging from 0.6 percent to 1.0 percent per year. The assumption about yield growth may be too optimistic, which may possibly understate future food gaps. Of course, any resumption of hostilities would dramatically affect these projections. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, these NIS countries depend on imports for a sizeable share of their total food supplies (ranging from about 30 percent to 60 percent). The share of imports in total food supplies is expected to increase. To finance these imports, these five countries will need to show steady growth in real export earnings. These countries' trade is highly open compared with many regions around the world. However, these five countries continue to depend on Russia and other former Soviet republics for trade (ranging from 40 percent to 80 percent of exports in 1999). After the Russian ruble devaluation in 1998, several of these countries devalued their own currencies to stay competitive, forcing a short-term contraction in imports and economic growth. Preliminary data suggest that the devaluation stimulated domestic output in Russia and the other NIS countries, which in the medium term may indirectly improve these countries' economies. The World Bank has projected that overall real GDP growth in the transition economies will average about 5 percent per year in the coming decade. Azerbaijan in particular is projected to grow quite rapidly. Over the past year, there have been a few key developments regarding the oil and gas sector in this region. A new oil pipeline went online connecting Baku, Azerbaijan, to Suspa, Georgia, on the Black Sea. A pipeline agreement was signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey that will allow oil to be delivered from Baku to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey, within 3 years. However, the economic viability of this deal remains questionable and may be determined by external oil and gas developments in several neighboring countries. Except for Tajikistan, recent national average per capita consumption levels in these NIS countries have been above nutrition requirements. In Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, all income groups are estimated to have adequate food supplies in the short and longrun to meet the minimum nutritional requirements. Although Georgia's recent national average per capita consumption level exceeds nutrition requirements, the 2000 drought has led to projections in which food supplies are nutritionally inadequate for each quintile group. However, this problem is expected to be resolved within a few years as production recovers. In Armenia, the two lowest income quintiles in 2000 are estimated to have inadequate food supplies to sustain minimum nutrition levels. However, by 2010, all income groups in Armenia are projected to have nutritionally adequate food supplies. In Tajikistan, the recent national average per capita consumption levels are below nutrition requirements by about 5 percentage points. In 2000, every quintile group is projected to fall below nutrition requirements. This situation should improve slightly by 2010 with the top income quintile reaching the nutritional requirement. We considered a scenario that hypothetically examined the effect of land degradation, assuming that the growth in land area is cut in half. Under this scenario, only Tajikistan would display food gaps. To maintain recent per capita food consumption levels, the gap would increase from 58,000 tons in 2010 in the base case to 67,000 tons; nutrition-based food gaps would increase from 70,000 tons to 118,000 tons. These relatively small changes in the food gaps reflect the already low growth rates assumed for future land area sown. Resource Quality, Agricultural Productivity, and Food Security in Developing Countries Keith Wiebe and Abebayehu Tegene1 Abstract: Raising agricultural productivity improves food security both through increased incomes for farmers and through increased food supplies for consumers. Productivity depends in turn on a variety of factors, including the quantities of fertilizer, water, and other inputs used in agricultural production. Recent advances in data and analysis show how productivity also depends critically on the quality of inputs used, including the quality of natural resources such as land. Within Sub-Saharan Africa, the productivity of agricultural land is found to be 28 percent higher in countries with favorable soils and climate than it is in countries with poor land quality, everything else being equal, and in Asia the difference is 34 percent. Productivity is especially responsive to increases in the use of fertilizer and irrigation in countries with poor land, while productivity in countries with good land is more responsive to improvements in labor quality and transportation infrastructure. Reductions in the incidence of armed conflict are important in both sets of countries. Keywords: land quality, agricultural productivity, food security. Resource Quality and Agricultural Productivity Sustained growth in agricultural productivity is critical to improving food security for two reasons. First, growth in agricultural productivity translates into increased food supplies and lower food prices for consumers. Second, growth in agricultural productivity means higher incomes and thus improved ability to purchase food and other basic necessities, for many food-insecure people who earn their livelihoods through agricultural production. Agricultural productivity depends in turn on a variety of factors. Recent studies (e.g. Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom, 1997, and Frisvold and Ingram, 1995) indicate that most differences in agricultural productivity, whether across households or countries or over time, can be attributed to differences in the quantity of conventional inputs used in agricultural production, such as land, labor, fertilizer, and machinery. But agricultural productivity also depends critically on the quality of inputs used, including the quality of natural resources such as land. As simple as this statement seems, the influence of resource quality on agricultural productivity has received insufficient attention in the past because appropriate data have been scarce. However, recent advances in data and analytical methods (see box, "Data and Methods") allow improved understanding of the ways in which agricultural productivity and food security are affected by differences in the quality of resources. Distinguishing the relative impacts of input quantity and quality is important in determining appropriate policy measures to improve agricultural productivity and food security. Soils and Climate Land-embodying soils, climate, and other characteristics-is one of the most basic resources used in agricultural production. Figure A-1 illustrates global differences in land quality, based on assessments by USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service of the suitability of soils and climate for agricultural production. Extensive areas of high-quality land are evident in North America and Europe. Land is of lower quality, on average, in Latin America, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and is poorest of all in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Figure A-2 illustrates global differences in average annual rainfall. Rainfall may be more equitably distributed on a global scale than is high-quality land, but substantial variations remain within regions and countries. Latin America receives abundant rainfall, on average, with the exception of northern Mexico, northeastern Brazil, and the western coast of South America. Western and central Africa receive more rain than northern, eastern, and southern parts of the continent, while southeast Asia and adjoining areas receive more rain than northern and western portions of India and China. Figure A-2 illustrates global differences in average annual rainfall. Rainfall may be more equitably distributed on a global scale than is high-quality land, but substantial variations remain within regions and countries. Latin America receives abundant rainfall, on average, with the exception of northern Mexico, northeastern Brazil, and the western coast of South America. Western and central Africa receive more rain than northern, eastern, and southern parts of the continent, while southeast Asia and adjoining areas receive more rain than northern and western portions of India and China. impossible, but they do mean that costs of production are likely to be higher and/or that yields and net returns are likely to be lower than they would be under more favorable conditions. (In other words, agricultural productivity is likely to be lower.) Figure A-3 illustrates where crop production actually dominates the landscape, based in part on land quality and rainfall patterns, along with other physical and economic characteristics. Large concentrations occur in North America, Europe, India, China, Brazil, and Argentina; cropland is more sparsely distributed in Africa and the Middle East. Combining this information on soils, climate, and land cover allows us to compare the quality of cropland by country and region. While the quality of all land is, on average, lowest in the Middle East and North Africa, the quality of cropland is lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 12 of 38 Sub-Saharan African countries studied, less than 1 percent of cropland is classified in the top three land-quality classes, and the median share of cropland that is classified in the top three land-quality classes in Sub-Saharan African countries is about 6 percent (fig.A- 4). This compares with a median of 16 percent in Asia (where 7 of 17 countries studied have more than a quarter of their land in the top three classes), 19 percent in the Middle East and North Africa (where 3 of 8 countries studied have more than a quarter of their land in the top three classes, and 27 percent in Latin America (where 12 of 19 countries studied have more than a quarter of their land in the top three classes). By contrast, the median share of high-quality cropland was 29 percent in the high- income countries, as defined by the World Bank (where 13 of 22 countries studied have more than a quarter of their land in the top three classes) and over 50 percent in Eastern Europe (where all six countries studied have more than a quarter of their cropland in the top three classes). Not surprisingly, econometric analysis of 110 countries during 1961-97 (see box, "Data and Methods") reveals that after taking into account other factors such as input levels, differences in the quality of cropland soils and climate are significantly related to differences in agricultural productivity. Within Sub- Saharan Africa, the productivity of agricultural land is 28 percent higher, on average, in countries with high land quality than it is in countries with poor land quality. The productivity difference attributable to high land quality is 34 percent in Asia, and 22 percent in the high-income countries. (In Latin America, where most countries lie above the global median in terms of land quality, only the best soils and climate are significantly associated with increased agricultural productivity.) These findings confirm our expectations and provide for the first time an empirical estimate of the significance that differences in the inherent physical quality of soils and climate have on agricultural productivity. Perhaps more important, however, are the insights they provide into the impact on agricultural productivity of more conventional inputs, such as quantities of land, labor, fertilizer, and machinery. Conventional Inputs and Other Factors To capture these impacts, we included in our econometric analysis country-level measures of conventional agricultural inputs like agricultural land, labor, tractors, livestock, and fertilizer. We also included factors such as annual rainfall on cropland, the percentage of each country's agricultural land that is classified as arable land or permanent cropland, the percentage of arable land or permanent cropland land that is not irrigated, life expectancy and illiteracy rates (as measures of labor quality), an indicator of the occurrence of armed conflict (as a measure of institutional stability), and road density and cumulative agricultural research and development expenditures (as measures of infrastructure). (Data on agricultural research and development expenditures were available only for 1961 through 1985, but they revealed a significant and positive association with agricultural productivity during that time.) Within each region, countries were classified according to the share of their cropland that is highly suitable for agricultural production (see box, "Data and Methods"). Countries where this share exceeds the median value for their region were identified as having good soils and climate; those with less than the median were identified as having poor soils and climate. Each group of countries was then analyzed separately to compare the impacts of individual factors on agricultural productivity by region and land-quality class. In Sub-Saharan African countries with good soils and climate, agricultural land productivity rises significantly with increases in quantities of labor, livestock, tractors, fertilizer, and annual rainfall. Productivity also improves with irrigation, labor quality (in the form of longer life expectancy and higher literacy rates), and transportation infrastucture and falls significantly with the occurrence of armed conflict. In Sub- Saharan African countries with poor soils and climate, productivity responds even more strongly to fertilizer application, irrigation, and political instability, but it is not sensitive to improvements in tractors, labor quality, or infrastructure. Overall, the results suggest a land quality- related hierarchy of constraints limiting agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In countries poorly endowed with soils and climate, basic inputs such as fertilizer, water (in the form of irrigation), and institutional stability are more important than they are in countries that are relatively well endowed. The evidence suggests that only when these constraints have been overcome do factors such as labor quality, road density, and mechanization become significantly associated with improvements in agricultural productivity-as they are in countries with better soils and climate. Similar patterns characterize other developing regions. In Latin America, increases in labor, fertilizer, and irrigation are associated with increased productivity of agricultural land in countries with poor soils and adverse climate but not in countries with good soils and beneficial climate. Improvements in literacy and transportation infrastructure are associated with increased productivity in countries with good soils and climate but not in those that are poorly endowed. In Asia, additional land, labor, and roads increase agricultural productivity in counties with good soils and climate but not in those that are poorly endowed, where productivity is relatively more sensitive to increased irrigation. (Specifically, productivity is positively related to an increase in irrigated area, but some authors (e.g. Rosegrant 1997) have noted that degradation of irrigated areas through waterlogging and salinization is also a significant and growing problem.) In the Middle East and North Africa, agricultural productivity is sensitive to levels of labor, tractors, and literacy in well-endowed countries but not in countries with poor soils and climate, where (as in Asia) productivity is relatively more sensitive to increased irrigation. Analysis of inherent land quality thus improves our understanding of the impacts on agricultural productivity of factors over which policy makers exercise at least some influence. The policy implications of these findings will be discussed further below. Analysis of differences in land quality across countries and regions also provides an initial indication of the potential impact on agricultural productivity of changes in land quality (i.e. land degradation) over time. Data on land degradation rates and impacts remain even more scarce than data on land quality, but most studies to date have found that global average productivity losses due to processes such as soil erosion, nutrient depletion, and salinization are small (on the order of 0.1 - 0.2 percent per year) in relation to historic gains in productivity (on the order of 2 percent per year) due to improvements in technology and input use (den Biggelaar et al. forthcoming, Crosson 1997; Byerlee, Heisey, and Pingali 1999; Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Rosegrant 1999). Nevertheless, in some areas with poor or fragile soils and inappropriate agricultural management practices, productivity losses could be significantly higher (Scherr 1999, Lal 1998). That such conditions are found in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where productivity levels are already low and the need for growth is correspondingly high is cause for concern. Implications for Food Security and Policy As noted earlier, agricultural productivity is important for food security both through its impact on food supplies and prices and through its impact on the incomes and purchasing power of those whose livelihoods depend on agricultural production. Through its effect on agricultural productivity, land quality is thus related directly to both food availability and food access. Land quality is, on average, lower in low-income, food-deficit countries than it is in high-income countries, and agricultural productivity is more sensitive to differences in land quality. These relationships have important implications for policymakers concerned with improving food security, both through protection and/or improvement of land quality itself and through recognition of the distinct roles played by more conventional agricultural inputs in areas that differ in land quality. In Sub-Saharan African countries with relatively poor soils and adverse climate, for example, the policy-sensitive variable most strongly associated with agricultural productivity is irrigation, followed by armed conflict and fertilizer use. Among the policy measures most important for increased agricultural productivity in those countries are thus investments in the efficient delivery and use of water and fertilizer, combined with efforts to improve institutional stability through the cessation of armed conflict. In Sub-Saharan African countries with good soils and climate, these factors remain important, but agricultural productivity becomes relatively more sensitive to improvements in labor quality and infrastructure. Policymakers in those countries may need to focus additional resources on investment in education, health, extension services, and transportation. Similar conclusions apply in other regions as well. In Latin American countries with relatively poor soils and climate, agricultural productivity and thus food security are likely to respond most strongly to policy measures to improve efficiency in the use of fertilizer and water and to reduce the occurrence of armed conflict. In Latin American countries with better land, productivity responds much more strongly to improvements in labor quality, infrastructure, and mechanization, suggesting the need for investments in education, transportation, and capital. Improvements in irrigation, education, and conflict reduction are important in Asian countries with poor land, while improved transportation remains important in Asian countries with good land. Increased application of fertilizer is not associated with improved agricultural productivity in Asia, regardless of land quality, reflecting the relatively high levels of use already observed there. In the Middle East and North Africa, not surprisingly, improvements in irrigation offer the greatest potential gains in agricultural productivity. Results and implications are generally consistent with the expectation that the greatest improvements in agricultural productivity will be realized by relaxing the constraints that bind most tightly and those constraints will vary from region to region according to differences in resource endowments and other factors. Neither is it surprising that the quality of soils and climate should play a key role in defining these differences. Yet only recently, with improvements in spatial data and methods, has characterizing these differences with increased precision at the multi-country scale become possible. Analysis to date supports the conclusion that policymakers in low-income, food-deficit countries face a hierarchy of priorities that depends critically on the quality of soils and climate but that is broadly consistent across regions. Continued research will be needed to further refine our understanding of the relationships of resource quality, agricultural productivity, and food security. References Byerlee, Derek, Paul Heisey, and Prabhu Pingali (1999). "Realizing Yield Gains for Food Staples in Developing Countries in the Early 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges." Presented to the Study Week on Food Needs of the Developing World in the Early 21st Century, the Vatican, January 27-30. Climatic Research Unit (1998). Climate Impacts LINK Project (U.K. Department of the Environment Contract EPG 1/1/16), Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia. Craig, Barbara, Philip G. Pardey, and Johannes Roseboom (1997). "International Productivity Patterns: Accounting for Input Quality, Infrastructure, and Research." American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, pp. 1064-76. Crosson, Pierre (1997). "Will Erosion Threaten Agricultural Productivity?" Environment, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp. 4-31 (October). den Biggelaar, Christoffel, Rattan Lal, Keith Wiebe, and Vince Breneman (2001). "Soil Erosion Impacts on Crop Yields in North America." Advances in Agronomy, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 1-52, 2001. Eswaran, Hari, Russell Almarez, Evert van den Berg, and Paul Reich (1997). "An Assessment of the Soil Resources of Africa in Relation to Productivity." Geoderma, Vol. 77, pp. 1-18. Frisvold, George, and Kevin Ingram (1995). "Sources of Agricultural Productivity Growth and Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa." Agricultural Economics Vol. 13, pp. 51-61. Lal, Rattan (1998). "Soil Erosion Impact on Agronomic Productivity and Environmental Quality." Critical Reviews in Plant Sciences Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 319-464. Pinstrup-Andersen, Per, Rajul Pandya-Lorch, and Mark W. Rosegrant (1999). World Food Prospects: Critical Issues for the Twenty- First Century. Food Policy Report, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Rosegrant, Mark W. (1997). Water Resources in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Implications for Action. Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper No. 20. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. March. Scherr, Sara J. (1999). Soil Degradation: A Threat to Developing- Country Food Security by 2020? Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper No. 27. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. February. United States Geological Survey/University of Nebraska- Lincoln/Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. (1999). "Global Land Cover Characterization. U.S. Geological Survey, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and European Commission's Joint Research Center . Wiebe, Keith, Meredith Soule, Clare Narrod, and Vince Breneman (2000). "Resource Quality and Agricultural Productivity: A Multi- Country Comparison." Selected Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, Tampa, FL, July 31, 2000 . Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa Shahla Shapouri and Stacey Rosen1 Abstract: Labor is the vital component of agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa. If size and structure are changed productivity of the labor force will directly affect food production and consumption in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa, with 11 percent of global population, has an estimated 73 percent of global HIV/AIDS-related infections. Little is known about the net affect of HIV/AIDS on the agricultural economy, but vulnerability to food insecurity will certainly increase in the severely affected countries. The estimated health and productivity costs of the epidemic will have long-term implications on the economic growth of the countries. Keywords: Sub-Saharan-Africa, AIDS, HIV, population growth, food production, food consumption, labor productivity. Introduction The projections of food gaps reveal the intensity of the current as well as the future food security problems in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2010, this region is projected to account for 65 percent of the total (all 67 countries covered in this report) gap to maintain consumption and 75 percent of the gap to meet nutritional needs even though the region's population constitutes only 25 percent of the 67-country total. The region's nutrition gap, as a share of consumption (total available food supplies), is projected to exceed 10 percent by 2010. Added to the food problem is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the region. The future impact of the HIV/AIDS disease on food systems is of major concern because of the already low and declining per capita food consumption and the low level of agricultural productivity in the region. Also, coping with and combating the disease in rural areas where poverty is at its highest and education is at its lowest level is the biggest challenge facing both individual countries and the international community. This article reviews the historical role of population (and the labor force) in food markets in Sub-Saharan Africa and the expected impact of HIV/AIDS on the structure of the population. It also examines the likely implications of the disease on food security in highly infected countries. The final section reviews the coping mechanism and response capacity. Background: Changes in Population Growth and Structure Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth during the 1980s was the highest in the world-about 3 percent per year. Since then, it has declined to 2.7 percent and is projected to decline further during this decade. The high population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa resulted from sharp mortality declines in the 1950s due to improved health services. Rapid population growth occurred in industrial countries between 1890 and 1920 and was supported by strong income growth and improvements in education and health. Their experience also shows that high population growth, when accompanied by appropriate and adequate investments in agricultural technology and supportive government policies, can have a positive impact on agricultural development. In Sub- Saharan Africa, however, fertility rates have remained high, incomes have stagnated, and low education levels have persisted. Although the high population growth put additional pressure on the demand side of the food market, it has remained the key source of productivity on the production side. In most Sub- Saharan countries, modernization of the agricultural sector has not yet occurred. Limited uses of new technology and poor market infrastructures are the two characteristics that have precluded an increase in agricultural productivity (see "Resource Quality, Agricultural Productivity, and Food Security in Developing Countries" p. 24.) Now, after a long period of dealing with the burden of growing populations, the region is facing a sharp decline in population growth rates. The problem, however, is that the decline is not a natural progression of development, but a result of the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. The disease has major implications for the economies and agricultural sectors of Africa. The two severely affected regions are Southern and Eastern Africa. In Southern Africa, seven countries-Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-are reported to have adult HIV prevalence of more than 20 percent. In most East African countries, HIV prevalence is more than 10 percent. In these countries, life expectancy is projected to decline to 30-40 years instead of 60-70 years (an estimate used prior to the spread of HIV/AIDS). According to a UN report, about 55 percent of all HIV infections in Sub-Saharan Africa are among women. Peak HIV prevalence among women is at age 25, that is 10 to15 years earlier than for men, changing the structure of the population. Thus, the most productive age cohort, 15-45, is dying the fastest from HIV/AIDS. This age cohort is nearly 50 percent of the population in highly HIV/AIDS affected countries. HIV prevalence among the relatively educated as well as high-income urban population is as high or higher than among low-income and rural groups. In Rwanda, Congo, and Zambia, the level of HIV infection in the highest socioeconomic strata is two to four times higher than among those in the lowest category. HIV/AIDS and Food Security In the countries mostly affect by HIV/AIDS, slow growth in agricultural productivity and overall economic growth that limited purchasing power resulted in growing food insecurity over the last two decades. Even in countries such as Uganda where food supplies are projected to be nutritionally adequate, food insecurity remains a major concern because of the low and wide disparity in purchasing power. Table B-1 shows the projected nutritional vulnerability in selected countries that are highly affected by HIV/AIDS. These projections include the decline in population growth and productivity of labor, as well as can be estimated. Most of the available studies have focused on the medical costs, and there is limited information on long-term economic costs of HIV/AIDS and the variation of the effects on different groups within countries. By the same token, any quantification of the net effect of HIV/AIDS on the food system is preliminary. However, the food system will be certainly subjected to shocks that could amplify the food insecurity of many countries. Shocks to Agricultural Productivity and Output from HIV/AIDS The size of the supply shock depends on the extent to which HIV/AIDS reduces the productivity of the agricultural labor in rural areas. The agricultural sector plays a crucial role in the economy of African countries in terms of both sources of food and exports to finance food imports. A review of the statistics of selected countries in table B-2 shows that with the exception of Kenya, the agricultural sector provides 80 percent of grain consumption in these countries. Grains contribute as much as 80 percent of per capita calorie consumption in these countries. The share of the agricultural sector in GDP for the same set of countries is in the range of 11 percent in Zambia to 47 percent in Tanzania. With labor as the prime component of agricultural production, the implication of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on food security of the countries could be staggering. In projecting crop production for these countries, we use an elasticity of 0.3, meaning that with a 1-percent decline in labor availability, production will decline by 0.3 percent. However, we did not account for a change in the quality of labor. In the Food Security model, the marginal productivity of labor is assumed to remain constant over the projection period. For the Sub-Saharan countries, this may be an overestimation because the decline in population growth is in part due to the spread of HIV/AIDS, which affects the most productive segment of the population. A decline in healthiness of rural populations is expected to reduce labor productivity in rural areas. The World Health Organization estimates that local losses in agricultural productivity from HIV/AIDS at the household or village level range from 10 to 50 percent in about 10 Sub-Saharan African countries. The high rate of infection among women will, in particular, have enormous implications on nutrition and poverty. Many farms are headed by women and on other farms women provide a large portion of total labor. For example, a study of two towns in Tanzania found that women provide 48 percent of agricultural labor including land preparation, planting, weeding, and harvesting while men did most of the marketing. Economic consequences will be compounded by the fact that women are barred from owning land in many countries. If a husband dies, the wife's lack of collateral limits her ability to obtain credit to keep the farm in operation or to purchase labor-saving technology. Also, an increase in the number of orphans places a burden on healthy women in the community who must care for the sick and dying, while simultaneously increasing their child care responsibilities. This dilemma compounds the effect of HIV/AIDS on agriculture because healthy women will have less time for farming activities. Another factor that can worsen the situation is the likely change in cropping patterns. For example, farmers are expected to move away from labor-intensive export crops to more subsistence crops that use less labor. Among food crops, a switch from corn to cassava would conserve considerable labor. However, cassava is less nutritious than corn. Nutritional intake is already below minimum standards in several countries, including those highly affected by HIV/AIDS. In 14 of the 17 countries in East and Southern Africa, per capita daily caloric intake is below the level required to attain a minimum nutritional standard (the calories required to sustain life with minimum activity). The nutritional vulnerability of the countries is projected to grow by 30 percent in the next decade. A domino effect follows: food supply deficits and decreased healthiness impair agricultural productivity through reduced food availability, which further reduces agricultural productivity and may hasten the onset of HIV/AIDS in weakened HIV-positive people. Effects of HIV/AIDS on Food Market Demand One of the effects of HIV/AIDS is declining living standards and, consequently, a reduction in food demand through lower population and income growth. The bleakest economic outlook is for GDP growth to decline from its already meager pace (table B-3). In Kenya, for example, GDP will probably be 14.5 percent lower than projections that do not account for the effects of HIV/AIDS. In Tanzania, the annual direct medical costs and losses in labor productivity are projected to be 2 percent to 4 percent of GDP. These costs are very troublesome because public and private incomes in these countries have stagnated or declined in the last 20 years and any increase in public and private outlays on health care must come at the expense of investment in economic development. More immediately, many health care needs are likely to be unmet due to prohibitive costs. To put this in perspective, the average public health expenditure for the region was 1.7 percent of GDP during 1990-97 and the region's per capita GNP in 1997 was $308; thus, annual health care spending was $5 per capita. Even in a country such as Zimbabwe that is on the high end of the region's income, the per capita expenditure was not much more than $10 per person. According to available reports, the life-extending drugs costs $11,000 a year in the United States. Even at a discounted rate, their costs far outstrip health expenditures in these countries. The implication of HIV/AIDS on the demand for food is clear. As incomes decline due to the spread of HIV, demand for food will decline, but as expected, the impact is more damaging to the lower income countries than the higher incomes. Low-income countries spend more than half of their income on food. In Africa, this share is in the range of 40 percent to 70 percent. The average income-calorie elasticity for Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 0.14 percent (using cross-country data). Thus, a 10- percent decline in income over the projected period will reduce calorie consumption by 1.4 percent. While this kind of decline would not affect the nutritional well being of high income countries such as the United States where per capita calorie availability is about 3,700 per day, it can have serious implication for the countries that live on the margin of the minimum calorie requirement. In Sub-Saharan Africa the average per capita calorie availability was about 2,200 per day in 1998, the lowest of all developing regions of the world. Added to the low level of calorie consumption is the quality of food consumed in the region. Cereals and starchy roots and pulses, low-cost foods, comprise 70 percent of the region's calorie consumption, while higher cost foods such as meat and dairy products that are good sources of vitamins and minerals are consumed at the lowest rates in the world. The decline in income will have varying implications for the entire population. Skewed income distribution in these countries exacerbates the problems for the poor. In most countries, the poorest 20 percent of the population holds only 4 percent to 8 percent of total national income, while the richest 20 percent holds nearly 50 percent. This disparity in purchasing power could worsen with the spread of HIV/AIDS. The food security estimates for the year 2000 indicate that food consumption by 60 percent of Sub-Saharan Africans falls short of meeting their nutritional requirements. More alarming, however, is the depth of the problem. Food consumption of the lowest income group is estimated to be 20 percent less than the nutritional requirement in year 2000. If the income distribution worsens, the implication will be serious. In African countries, most of the poor live in rural areas. In rural areas, most farmers are subsistence producers and have limited assets to bear the reduction or loss in their productivity. For the rural landless laborer, HIV/AIDS means a severe cut in purchasing power. Also, there is no formal safety- net program to provide support for the sick and unemployed in these countries. Therefore, the family network must provide the support. Overall, any reduction in agricultural output and/or demand for food below the current low levels will have serious consequences for food security of the severely affected countries. Even without taking into account the side effects of HIV/AIDS, a continuation of present trends in food consumption is projected to lead to deteriorating food security in these countries. Investment and a concerted policy response by the affected governments must occur if these losses are to be minimized. Coping Mechanism and Response Capacity To identify coping options in dealing with the impact of HIV/AIDS on food security, one should examine forces that shape the food markets of these countries. One important characteristic of the market is that the agriculture sector is the main source of both food production and exports to finance food imports. Agricultural sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa have performed poorly and are generally characterized by (1) low productivity that is now compounded by the spread of HIV/AIDS, (2) a lack of resources and affordable technology to increase productivity, and (3) a low literacy rate that limits access to know-how and technology as well as access to knowledge for essential behavioral change. These factors reinforce each other, and altering the situation requires attacking all three problems simultaneously. To reduce the economic costs of HIV/AIDS, African countries must design an economic strategy in which health policy is a major component. Public policy should aim at providing information wherein health is a precondition of economic wellbeing. Currently, there are success stories in the region. Uganda has launched major preventive efforts during the last decade and has managed to reduce the rate of infection. Now, the growing awareness by officials at the international level has led to an increase in financial aid to improve and expand the preventive measures to reduce the rate of infection. This should ease costs and support national programs. Educational messages to prevent the spread of disease, if combined with economic assistance to cope with the situation, are the most efficient ways of using new resources. For example, in response to the reduction in food supplies, nutritional education, particularly the mother's education, is important to provide information on food processing and nutritional conservation. To promote self-reliance and more sustainable responses in highly affected HIV areas, governments should encourage communities to diversify their economic activities. Many communities in Africa have started income-generating activities such as raising poultry or gardening to improve their financial situation and to help families affected by HIV/AIDS. In Malawi and Uganda, village banks give small loans to households to start their own enterprise such as market trading and honey production. In Uganda, 75 percent of households who received loans recently reported that they were caring for orphans (U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID)-Impact on HIV, June 2000). In sum, the projected long-term food outlook for these countries shows a steady increase in food gaps, both to maintain per capita consumption and to meet nutritional requirements. Sub-Saharan Africa historically has shown the smallest improvement in average daily per capita calorie consumption. The HIV/AIDS crisis, which has already reduced the supply of labor in many countries, is projected to deepen the food insecurity problems of the region. Our projections, however, do not capture the full economic implications of HIV/AIDS, such as the decline in labor quality, medical/care costs, and costs associated with change in population structure. The challenge is new and has no simple remedy. As for the agriculture sector, strategies should aim at promoting domestic production. Unless urgent steps are taken to reverse the technological stagnation in the agricultural sector, HIV/AIDS will further deteriorate the food security problem of the region. The process, however, will be long and require consistent policies and credible institutional bodies. Given current economic and resource constraints, governments will have to make difficult choices about HIV/AIDS care, prevention, and revitalization of their economies. References African Development Bank (1993). "AIDS (HIV) and Development," Annual meeting symposium, Abidjan, Cte d'Ivoire, May 11. Becker, Charles (1990). "The Demo-Economic Impact of the AIDS Pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa," World Development Report, Vol.18. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, pp. 1599-1619. Chenery, H., and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., (1988). Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publisher. Cuddington, John T. (1993). "Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of AIDS, with an Application to Tanzania," The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, May, p. 173. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (1999). Sustainable Agriculture/Rural Development and Vulnerability to the AIDS Epidemic. Geneva, Switzerland, December. Gellman, Barton (2000). "DeathWatch: The Global Response to AIDS in Africa," Washington Post, June 5, pp. A1, 12-13. Guerny, J. (1999). "AIDS and Agriculture in Africa: Can Policy Make a Difference?," Food, Nutrition, and Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Vol. 25. International Labor Office (2000). HIV/AIDS: A Threat to Decent Work, Productivity, and Development, Geneva, Switzerland, June 2. Kambou, Gerard, Shatayanan Deverajan, and Mead Over (1993). "The Economic Impact of AIDS in an African Country: Simulations with a Computable General Equilibrium Model of Cameroon," Journal of African Economies, Vol. 1, No. 1. Karen A. Stanecki (2000). "The AIDS Pandemic in the 21st Century: The Demographic Impact in Developing Countries," World Population Profile 2000, U.S. Census Bureau, in press. Lorch, Donatella (1993). "Uganda, Scarred by AIDS, Turns to its Youth," front page story, New York Times, February 23. p. 1. National Intelligence Council (2000). The Global Infectious Disease Threat and its Implications for the United States, Environmental Change and Security Report, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center. Way, Francis, and Mead Over (1992). "The Projected Economic Impact of an AIDS Epidemic," paper presented at the annual meeting of Population Association of America, Denver, Co, April 28-May 2. END_OF_FILE